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OPINION OF THE COURT  
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to review the District Court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the United States Postal Service, 
and against its employee, Charles Iadimarco. Iadimarco filed an action 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
alleging "reverse discrimination" after he was denied a requested 
promotion within the Postal Service. The District 
Court ruled that Iadimarco had not established a prima facie case of 
illegal discrimination. The court also ruled in the alternative that, 
assuming Iadimarco had established a prima facie case, he had not rebutted 
the defendant's 
race-neutral explanation for the challenged employment decision. For the 
reasons that follow, we hold that Iadimarco established a prima facie case 
under Title VII. We also hold that he produced sufficient evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's 
explanation was a pretext for illegal discrimination. Accordingly, we will 
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
 
In 1992, the Postal Service undertook a national reorganization in which 
many jobs were consolidated or eliminated. After the reorganization, 
managerial employees were informed that they had to submit a "991 form" to 
indicate their preferences for available jobs. Employees could apply for 
positions as long as they were within six EAS levels for processing and 
distribution positions. Charles Iadimarco, a White male, submitted a 991 
form indicating his preference for three positions: Manager of In-plant 
Support at Kilmer (EAS 21), Manager of In-plant Support at Trenton (EAS 
21), and Manager of In-plant Support at Monmouth (EAS 19).  
 
After the Kilmer and Trenton jobs were filled by White males, Iadimarco 
contacted Robert Towler, the selecting 
official for Monmouth, about the Monmouth position. Towler had rated each 
of the 41 applicants for the Monmouth 
position according to a "knowledge, skills and abilities" matrix ("KSA") 
that was part of the applicants' 991 form.1 
Iadimarco was one of only three candidates for the Monmouth position who 
received a rating of "superior" in every 
KSA category.  
 
The District Court found that Towler interviewed Iadimarco for the 
Monmouth position in March 1993, though the 
issue was disputed. In any event, Iadimarco claims that Towler told him 
that he (Iadimarco) would be selected for the position pending approval of 
Henry Pankey, Towler's supervisor. However, on March 25, 1993, and again 
on April 1, 1993, Towler requested permission to re- post the Monmouth 
position. At trial, Towler testified that the other two top candidates for 
the Monmouth position had been placed in other positions before the 
Monmouth position could be filled, and he did not think that Iadimarco 
should be promoted by "default." According to Towler, he therefore re-
posted the position rather than merely hiring Iadimarco who was then the 
only applicant remaining who had received a superior rating in every KSA 
category. Iadimarco alleges that Towler re-posted the 
 
_________________________________________________________________  
1. The KSAs for the position were the ability to:  
 
(1) manage the implementation of national and area processing and 
distribution programs and policies.  
 
(2) manage the review and evaluation of local operations.  
 
(3) manage the development of local requirements for resources.  
 (4) resolve issues with customers, major mailers, and suppliers.  
 
(5) provide technical support to post offices.  
 
(6) manage the work of people to meet organization goals, including 
organizing and structuring the work, establishing effective work 
relationships, and facilitating the flow of work-related information.  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 2.  
_________________________________________________________________  
 
position because Towler was having difficulty getting Iadimarco's name 
past Pankey. Iadimarco's contention is based upon his belief that Pankey 
wanted to hire a minority applicant for the Monmouth position to diversify 
the work place.2 Iadimarco's assertion is based in large part upon a 
memorandum that Pankey issued to all plant managers and installation heads 
in December of 1992 (the "diversity memo"). The memo stated:  
 
As we proceed to fill vacancies, I want to ensure that very serious 
consideration is given to the issue of diversity - I cannot emphasize this 
point more strongly. The management teams in our plants should reflect the 
composition of our workforce and communities if we are to benefit from the 
contributions that minorities, women, and ethnic groups can bring to our 
decision making processes and the social harmony that this will instill in 
our work environment.  
 
Your personal commitment is needed -- if there are any questions on this 
matter, please feel free to contact me.  
Although Pankey admitted signing this memo, he denied writing it.  
 
On or about March 25, 1993, Iadimarco and Towler discussed placing 
Iadimarco into the position of Operations 
Support Specialist (EAS 16) in the Monmouth facility. Iadimarco claims 
that he did not accept the position, but Towler testified that Iadimarco 
did accept it. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Iadimarco did accept the 
position of Operations Support Specialist in the Trenton facility in early 
March or April. Thereafter, Toni Williams, a Black female, was promoted to 
Acting In-plant Support Manager for the Monmouth facility. Towler formally 
announced Ms. Williams' selection as the In-plant Support Manager 
approximately two weeks later.  
 
On May 28, 1993, Iadimarco initiated a proceeding before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission because 
_________________________________________________________________  
2. The majority of managers at the relevant level are White males. A197.  
_________________________________________________________________  
 
he believed that he had been denied the Monmouth position because he is a 
White male. The complaint was eventually heard by an Administrative Law 
Judge who agreed that Iadimarco had been the victim of illegal race and 
gender discrimination. However, the ALJ's findings were rejected by the 
EEOC. The agency concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination because he had accepted another position 
before being denied the In-plant Manager position at Monmouth. Iadimarco 
then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey alleging illegal racial discrimination under Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Following discovery, the District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service and against 
Iadimarco. This appeal followed.3  
 
II. Discussion  
 
A. The District Court's Decision. 
 
The District Court concluded that it had to apply the ever-present burden-
shifting analysis announced in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In conducting that 
analysis, the District Court noted a split among the courts of appeals in 
"reverse discrimination" cases as to the prerequisites of a prima facie 
case required of a White male. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 5, n.2, and cases 
cited therein. The court stated that although "the Third Circuit has yet 
to address this issue, most of the [district] courts in this Circuit have 
required plaintiffs to first establish background circumstances that 
support an inference that the defendant employer is "the unusual employer 
who discriminates against the majority." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________  
3. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et 
seq. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.§ 1291. Our review is plenary. Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 56 
F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1995). See also 
Marzano v. Computer Science Corp. Inc., 91 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). We 
"must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, 
giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from 
the evidence." Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496 (citing Torre v. Casio Inc., 42 
F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
_________________________________________________________________  
 
(quoting Wallick v. AT & T Communications Inc. , 1991 WL 635610 at *6 
(D.N.J. 1991) ("Although Title VII .. . prohibits discrimination against a 
majority group,`it makes little sense, within the historical context of 
the Act, to infer discrimination against [the majority] in the same way 
that discrimination is inferred against [minorities].' ")). The District 
Court quoted Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in observing 
that evidence of "background circumstances" "can be divided into two 
general categories: (1) evidence indicating that the particular employer 
at issue has some reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously 
against [W]hites, . . . . and (2) evidence indicating that there is 
something `fishy' about the facts of the case at hand that raises an 
inference of discrimination." Harding, 9 F.3d at 153.4  
 
The District Court then held that Iadimarco did not "sustain his burden of 
showing the requisite background 
circumstances," Dist. Ct. Op. at 6, under Harding. The court held that 
"plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to 
show that he was more qualified than Williams." Id. at 7. In reaching that 
conclusion, the court rejected Iadimarco's 
request that it examine the job applications of the two competing 
candidates and find that he was more qualified than 
Williams. The court stated "[p]laintiff does not . . . explain . . . how 
his application exhibits that he has `superior 
qualifications than Williams.' Moreover, from examining the applications, 
this Court is unable to determine that plaintiff had `superior 
qualifications.' " Id.5 
_________________________________________________________________  
4. In Harding, the court clarified that the "[b]ackground circumstances 
need not mean `some circumstances in the employer's background.' " Id. 
Rather, the court merely required a plaintiff who was not a member of a 
"historically disfavored" group to present evidence of circumstances that 
would support a finding that the challenged actions were motivated by 
racial animus.  
 
5. Iadimarco did present evidence that the Trenton plant manager, Stuart 
Gossoff, who eventually hired Iadimarco, felt that the latter's 
qualifications were superior to Williams'. However, the District Court 
concluded that Gossoff 's opinion was irrelevant because he was not 
involved in the decision to hire the In-plant Manager in Monmouth. See 




The District Court reasoned that the mere fact that both Pankey and Towler 
were Black was "insufficient to show background circumstances supporting 
the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates 
against the majority." Dist. Ct. Op. at 8.  We agree that the race of the 
selecting officials is not a sufficient circumstance to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination by itself. Although the race and/or gender of 
the individual(s) responsible for a hiring decision is certainly relevant, 
it is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
without more.  
 
In holding that Iadimarco had not presented any evidence of discrimination 
other than the race of Pankey and Towler, the District Court rejected 
Iadimarco's assertion that the diversity memo was a "smoking gun." See 
Appellee's Br. at 22. The District Court held that the memo was 
"insufficient to create the suspicion that the requisite background 
circumstances existed" under Harding because the memo did nothing more 
than restate policy enunciated in the Civil Service Reform Act. Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 10. See also 5 C.F.R. § 720 App. to Pt. 720 at 13 ("The [Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978] establishes in law as the first merit 
principle that recruitment should be designed to achieve a Federal 
workforce from `all segments of society.' ").  
 
The court also held that, assuming arguendo that Iadimarco's evidence was 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case, he had not presented 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the 
employer's justification for hiring Williams was a pretext for illegal 
discrimination. The court accepted Towler's explanation that he hired 
Williams because she was "the right person for the job." Dist. Ct. Op. at 
14. In doing so, the court relied in part upon the following exchange from 
Towler's deposition:  
 Toni Williams seemed to be right for the plant at the time. She offered a 
fresh approach to the work room floor. She offered a fresh approach to the 
employees out there . . . I am not viewed as the gentlest person around. . 
. .  
 
The In-Plant was meant to be a buffer. The Manager In-Plant was meant to 
access those people on the work room floor with the problems that they 
were having. . . . A person that had the ability to interface with people.  
Had no problem in what operations were out there on the work room floor.  
 
Q: You don't think Mr. Iadimarco had these qualities?  
 
A: I could not recall Mr. Iadimarco having exhibited those qualities when 
he was here in Monmouth.  
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 15.  
 
The District Court correctly noted that we have not yet decided upon the 
proper expression of a prima facie case in "reverse discrimination" cases. 
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to provide guidance for the trial 
courts in this 
Circuit.  
 
B. The Prima Facie Case in "Reverse Discrimination"  
 
Suits Under Title VII.  
 
42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2 states that: 
(a) Employer Practices  
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -  
 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (West 1997).  
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that an employer who discriminates will 
almost never announce a discriminatory animus or provide employees or 
courts with direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Accordingly, the 
Court  fashioned the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to allow 
plaintiffs to proceed without direct proof of illegal discrimination where 
circumstances are such that common sense and social context suggest that 
discrimination has occurred. In the "ordinary case" where a minority 
plaintiff alleges race-based employment discrimination, the plaintiff 
"must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination . . . . by showing (i) that he belongs 
to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from 
persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
802.  
 
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,"the burden then must 
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection." Id. at 802. However, "the defendant 
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the 
proffered reasons." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 254 (1981). For purposes of defeating a plaintiff 's motion for 
summary judgment, "[i]t is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether it discriminated against the 
plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. If the employer offers some evidence 
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason then plaintiff must "be afforded 
a fair opportunity to show that [employer's] stated reason for [plaintiff 
's] rejection was in fact pretext." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
"The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it 
eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff 's 
rejection." Burdine, 450 U.S.  at 253-54.  
 
Inasmuch as the first prong of this test requires plaintiff to establish 
his or her identity as a member of a minority group, the literal 
application of the test would preclude its use by White plaintiffs 
alleging "reverse discrimination." In fact, the historical context of 
Title VII allowed for some debate as to whether Congress intended to 
extend its reach to practices that have come to be known as "reverse 
discrimination." However, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976), Justice Marshall, writing for a 
unanimous Court, stated: "[t]he Act prohibits All racial discrimination in 
employment, without exception for any group of particular employees. . . 
." Thus, it is now clear that the dictates of Title VII "are not limited 
to discrimination against members of any particular race [and Title VII] 
proscribe[s] racial discrimination in private employment against [W]hites 
on the same terms as racial 
discrimination against nonwhites." Id. at 278-79, 280. No doubt because of 
this country's history of race relations, most Title VII plaintiffs have 
been members of a minority group, and the first prong of the McDonnell 
Douglas test was stated in the context of that history.  
 
The premise underlying the varied McDonnell Douglas standards remains 
unchanged. It stems from Congressional 
efforts to address this nation's history of discrimination against racial 
minorities, a legacy of racism so entrenched that we presume acts, 
otherwise unexplained, embody its effect.  
 
Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985). 
However, the holding of Santa Fe Trail as well as the language of 
McDonnell Douglas itself clearly establishes that the substance of the 
burden-shifting analysis applies with equal force to claims of "reverse 
discrimination."  
 
Nevertheless, courts have struggled in attempting to apply the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework to Title VII suits by White plaintiffs, 
and no universally accepted statement of the appropriate standard has 
emerged. The confusion arises from the wording of the very first prong of 
the McDonnell Douglas test. Obviously, a White plaintiff can not establish 
"membership in a minority group" in the same way a Black plaintiff can. In 
an effort to "cram"6 the "reverse discrimination" cases into the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, most courts of appeals that have considered the issue 
require White plaintiffs to present evidence of "background circumstances" 
that establish that the defendant is "that unusual employer who 
discriminates against the majority," Parker v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 652 
F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981), instead of showing minority group 
status. In Parker, the court 
_________________________________________________________________  
6. See Eastridge v. Rhode Island College, 996 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. R.I., 
1998) ("attempting to cram a reverse discrimination case into the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is not a reasonable approach. . . ."); Cully 




explained the rationale for adopting that change to the traditional 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case:  
 
The original McDonnell Douglas standard required the plaintiff to show 
"that he belongs to a racial minority." 
Membership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption on which the 
entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated, for only in that context 
can it be stated as a general rule that the `light of common experience' 
would lead a factfinder to infer discriminatory motive from the 
unexplained hiring of an outsider rather than a group member. Whites are 
also a protected group under Title VII, but it defies common sense to 
suggest that the promotion of a Black employee justifies an inference of 
prejudice against White co-workers in our present society.  
Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017. After Parker was decided, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit amplified its "background circumstances" modification 
of McDonnell Douglas. The court stated:  
 
The evidence that this Court has found in the past to constitute 
"background circumstances" can be divided into two categories: (1) 
evidence indicating the particular employer . . . has some reason or 
inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites, and (2) evidence 
indicating that there is something "fishy" about the facts of the case at 
hand that raises an inference of discrimination.  
 
Harding, at 153. The court also cautioned that " `background 
circumstances' need not mean`some circumstances in the employer's 
background.' " Rather, the court noted "[o]n the contrary, other evidence 
about the `background' of the case at hand -- including an allegation of 
superior qualifications -- can be equally valuable." Id. The court also 
insisted that the "background circumstances" test "is not an additional 
hurdle for white plaintiffs," and asserted that it was merely"a faithful 
transposition of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test . . ." into the 
context of "reverse discrimination." Id. at 154.  
 
Despite that clarification, some courts have concluded that substituting 
"background circumstances" for the first prong of McDonnell Douglas does 
raise the bar, and those courts have rejected the Parker/Harding analysis 
for that reason.  For example, in Eastridge, the court concluded that the 
Parker/Harding test "require[s] a reverse discrimination plaintiff to show 
that the specific employer has displayed a pattern of discrimination 
against the majority in the past [and therefore] imposes a more onerous 
burden on such a plaintiff as compared to any plaintiff from any protected 
group." 996 F.Supp. at 161. See also Ulrich v. Exxon Co., 824 F.Supp. 677, 
683-4 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (describing the "background circumstances" test as 
imposing a"heightened burden" and citing cases that have criticized it). 
In Cully v. Robertson, Inc., 20 F.Supp. 2d 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y., 1998), the 
court invited a comparison between Parker and Lucas v. Dole, 835 F.2d 532 
(4th Cir. 1987), and described the former as requiring a "higher prima 
facie burden for reverse discrimination plaintiffs" and the latter as 
having "no higher prima facie burden." In Collins v. School District of 
Kansas City, 727 F.Supp. 1318, 1320 (W.D. Mo., 1990), the court concluded 
that the "background circumstances" test required a "special showing" of 
White Plaintiffs, and rejected the test for that reason. The court also 
concluded that the "unusual employer" prong of Parker established an 
"arbitrary barrier which serves only to frustrate those who have 
legitimate Title VII claims." Although the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit had not yet spoken on the issue, the court in Collins relied upon 
Loeffler v. Carlin, 780 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1985) to reason that the 
court of appeals would also decline to follow the Parker line of cases. In 
Loeffler, the court concluded that a male plaintiff had established a 
prima facie case in a gender discrimination suit without showing any 
background circumstances to suggest that the defendant was the "unusual 
employer who discriminates against the majority." The Collins court 
reasoned that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would not, 
therefore, adopt the heightened burden the district court believed was 
endemic in the "background circumstances" inquiry. However, when the Court 
of Appeals was finally called upon to address the issue of the appropriate 
prima facie standard required in "reverse discrimination" cases, it did 
adopt the Parker/ Harding requirement of "background circumstances." See 
Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 1997). In Duffy, the court had to 
decide if a White male plaintiff who had alleged gender discrimination in 
the context of a Bivens action7 had established a prima facie case. The 
plaintiff was precluded from bringing a Title VII action by statute8 but 
the court used a McDonnell Douglas analysis in analyzing the applicable 
burdens in the context of a Bivens claim. In doing so, the court relied 
heavily upon the Parker line of cases. The court concluded that the 
plaintiff had presented evidence of at least three "background 
circumstances [to] support the suspicion that [the defendant] was that 
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." Id. at 1037 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
The "background circumstances" test has been adopted by the respective 
circuit court of appeals in each of the 
following cases: Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Duffy, 123 F.3d at 1036-37; 
Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585 
(10th Cir. 1992); and Murray, 770 F.2d at 66-67. However, application and 
interpretation of the test has often proven difficult. In addition to the 
concerns expressed by the aforementioned district courts, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has gone so far as to question its earlier 
adoption of the test. In Murray, the district court had relied upon Parker 
in concluding that the White plaintiff had failed to show the required 
"background circumstances" necessary to establish his prima facie case 
under McDonnell Douglas. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit had stated: "[w]e agree with the district court that a prima facie 
case of `reverse discrimination' is established upon a showing that 
`background circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that 
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority'[.]" 770 F.2d at 
67 (citing Parker). However, nine years later in Pierce v. Commonwealth 
Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994), the same court noted that the 
"background circumstances" test had been criticized for imposing a 
"heightened standard," on White plaintiffs. 
_________________________________________________________________  
7. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
 
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
The court then stated: "[w]e have serious misgivings about the soundness 
of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are 
[W]hite or male than for their non-[W]hite or female counterparts." 
Pierce, 40 F.3d at 801 n. 7.  However, the Pierce court did not have to 
resolve the obvious tension between that pronouncement and Murray's 
adoption of that test, because the plaintiff in Pierce could not meet the 
second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.  
 
Here, as stated above, the District Court substituted the "background 
circumstances" requirement for the minority group status otherwise 
required under the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. We now 
reject the"background circumstances" analysis set forth in Parker , 
Harding, and their progeny.  
 
The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas merely states "the basic 
allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof [under] Title 
VII. . ." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 (1980). It raises an inference of 
discrimination 
only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained in the 
context of the prongs of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, are more 
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. See 
Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). However, "[t]he 
central focus of the inquiry . . . is always whether the employer is 
treating some people less favorably than others because of their race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 
Accordingly, all that should be required to establish a prima facie case 
in the context of "reverse discrimination" is  for the plaintiff to 
present sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the 
employer is treating some people less favorably than others based upon a 
trait that is protected under Title VII.  
 
The factual inquiry in a Title VII case is whether the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. In other words, is the 
employer treating some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The prima facie case 
method established in McDonnell Douglas was never intended to be rigid, 
mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way 
to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the 
critical question of discrimination.  
 
U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). 
Stating the prima facie case in terms of "background circumstances" and 
the uniqueness of the particular employer is both problematic and 
unnecessary. As noted above, many of the courts that have tried to apply 
such an analysis have concluded that it results in a heightened burden for 
the plaintiff despite the aforementioned proclamations to the contrary by 
the court that developed the test.9 
The pronouncement in Harding that the analysis there did not heighten the 
plaintiff's burden has not convinced several of the district courts that 
have had to determine the appropriate analysis.  
 
Moreover, the suggestion that a plaintiff must prove "background 
circumstances" to establish that the defendant is a "unique employer that 
discriminates against the majority" has a tendency to force the plaintiff 
to initially present proof that would otherwise only become relevant to 
rebut the employer's explanation of the challenged conduct. As noted 
above, in Harding, the court defined "background circumstances" to 
include: "(1) evidence indicating that the  particular employer at issue 
has some reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites, 
. . . and (2) evidence indicating that there is something `fishy' about 
the facts of the case at hand that raises an inference of discrimination." 
Harding, 9 F.3d at 153. The court further stated that the "background 
circumstances" test requires a member of a majority group to proffer 
evidence that the challenged actions were motivated by racial animus. But 
this is the underlying inquiry in any Title VII case. Thus, the 
Parker/Harding modification can undermine the basic point of the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting regime to make it easier for employees to bring 
claims that would otherwise be extraordinarily difficult to prove. The 
Supreme Court imposed the burden-shifting test to eliminate early on some 
of the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for employment decisions, as 
well as to place 
_________________________________________________________________  
9. See Harding, 9 F.3d at 154.  
_________________________________________________________________  
 
the burden of production on the party with the most access to the 
employer's decision making process, i.e., the employer itself. Parker, 
Harding, and their progeny go too far in amending the prima facie case to 
include allegations of reverse discrimination.  
 
Moreover, to the extent it might be argued that Harding does not go as far 
as we suggest, we believe that the concept of "background circumstances" 
is irremediably vague and ill-defined. For example, one of the alleged 
background circumstances here is that Iadimarco was more qualified than 
Williams. That can hardly be termed a "background circumstance," unless 
that term is defined to include anything that suggests discrimination. 
Indeed, some courts have proclaimed their adoption of the "background 
circumstances" requirement as suggested by Parker and Harding, but have 
further modified that test in a manner that renders the test itself 
absolutely unnecessary. For example, in Notari, 971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 
1992), the court stated:  
 
we agree that a Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff who pursues a 
reverse discrimination claim, and seeks to  obtain the benefit of the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption, must, in lieu of showing he belongs to a 
protected group, establish background circumstances that support an 
inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who 
discriminates against the majority.  
971 F.2d at 589.  
 
However, the court then held that such a plaintiff could also establish a 
prima facie case by direct evidence, or by indirect evidence that 
supported afinding of discriminatory intent.  
 
We adopt the set of prima facie case alternatives that the Fourth Circuit 
has outlined. Thus, a plaintiff who presents direct evidence of 
discrimination or indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable 
probability, that but for the plaintiff 's status the challenged 
employment decision would have favored the plaintiff states a prima facie 
case of intentional discrimination under Title VII. Id., at 590 (emphasis 
added). However, it is obvious that this alternative method of indirect 
proof negates the need to ever present evidence of "background 
circumstances." All that will ever be required of a White-male plaintiff 
under this test is that he present sufficient evidence to support the 
reasonable probability of discrimination. There is no need to embark upon 
the problematic detour of showing "background circumstances."  
 
The "Fourth Circuit" case referred to in Notari is Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 
794 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986). Holmes involved a Title VII suit by a Black 
plaintiff who alleged that he was denied a promotion based upon his race. 
After the defendant employer selected a White applicant tofill the vacant 
position, the vacancy ceased to exist, and  Holmes could therefore not 
establish that the position remained open after his rejection as required 
by the fourth  prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Recognizing the 
practical problem created by requiring a minority plaintiff in Holmes' 
position to establish a continuing vacancy, the court made a common sense 
adjustment to the fourth prong and simply required plaintiff to present 
"some other evidence that his race was a factor considered by his employer 
in not granting him the promotion." In adopting this substituted inquiry 
the court stated: "[t]here must be some evidence that race was a 
determining factor in the employer's decision." Holmes, 794 F. 2d at 147. 
Prior to focusing on the problem presented by the original formulation of 
the McDonnell Dougas inquiry, the court had stated:  
 
This is a disparate treatment case, and a prima facie case may be 
established by direct evidence of discrimination or 
by indirect evidence whose cumulative probative force, apart from the 
presumption's operation, would suffice under 
the controlling standard to support as a reasonable probability the 
inference that but for the plaintiff 's race he would 
have been promoted. Without such evidence, the claimant must resort to the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption with all of its ensuing complexities.  
794 F.2d at 146 (footnote omitted).  
 
The court in Notari used this statement of a methodology of proof under 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, and then incorporated it into the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis it employed to fill the interstices left by the 
"background circumstances" inquiry it had adopted.   
 
Moreover, one might contend that a "background 960<!>circumstance" must be 
something in the employer's  background. Such a requirement does raise the 
bar for the prospective "reverse discrimination" plaintiff, 
notwithstanding the denial of this limitation in Harding. Moreover, a 
review of cases addressing this issue illustrates that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to come up with a definition of "background circumstances" 
that is clear, neither under- nor over inclusive, and possible to satisfy. 
In Stock v. Universal Foods Corp., 817 F.Supp. 1300 (D. Md.  1993), the 
court replaced the "background circumstances" requirement with the 
requirement that plaintiff establish "he belongs to a class." 817 F.Supp. 
at 1306. In Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d, 304 (11th Cir. 1991), the court 
also stated Title VII requires a White plaintiff to establish that "he 
belongs to a class" as the first step in establishing a prima facie case 
under McDonnell Douglas. However, neither court further defined the 
"class" to which it was referring. The discussion in Stock and Wilson 
illustrate just how vague and problematic the Parker/Harding approach can 
be.  Inasmuch as everyone belongs to some "class," substituting membership 
in an undefined class for membership in a minority group is tantamount to 
eliminating the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework sub 
silentio.   
 
Moreover, the amorphous nature of "background circumstances" can lead to 
jury confusion. The Title VII plaintiff needs only to present sufficient 
evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the unexplained decision 
that forms the basis of the allegation of discrimination was motivated by 
discriminatory animus. It is at the pretext stage that "background 
circumstances" would normally be introduced. Courts struggling with 
"cramming" the "background circumstances" inquiry into thefirst prong of 
McDonnell Douglas may well require "pretextual" evidence as part of   the 
plaintiff 's initial evidence. Such evidence may be relevant to the 
"background circumstances" surrounding the claim of discrimination or to a 
finding that defendant is an employer that is likely to discriminate. The 
result is the "heightened burden" many district courts have criticized and 
that Harding disclaimed.  
 
Accordingly, rather than require "background circumstances" about the 
uniqueness of the defendant employer, a plaintiff who brings a "reverse 
discrimination" suit under Title VII should be able to establish a prima 
facie case in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination by 
presenting sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to 
conclude (given the totality of the circumstances) that the defendant 
treated plaintiff"less favorably than others because of [his] race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin." Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. With this 
standard in mind, we turn to the evidence Iadimarco presented to support 
his Title VII claim.10 
_________________________________________________________________  
10. Judge McKee believes that the approach set forth in Parker and Harding 
is merely a restatement of the McDonnell Douglas test just as the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit intended it to be. He concludes that 
"[I]nvidious discrimination against[W]hite [men] is relatively uncommon in 
our society, and so there is nothing inherently suspicious in an 
employer's decision to promote a qualified minority [or female] applicant 
instead of a qualified [W]hite[male] applicant." Harding, 9 F.3d at 153. 
In his view, requiring a White male plaintiff to show certain "background 
circumstances" merely requires that plaintiff to present some evidence 
from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that it is more likely 
than not that the unfavorable employment decision is the result of 
discriminatory animus. Judge McKee's belief is based in part upon 
Livingston v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 802 F.2d  1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986), 
set forth above, wherein the court explained:  
 
the presumptions in the Title VII analysis that are valid when the 
plaintiff belongs to a disfavored group are not necessarily justified when 
the plaintiff is a member of an historically favored group. Accordingly, 
when a plaintiff who is a member of a favored group alleges disparate 
treatment, the courts have adjusted the prima facie case to reflect this 
specific context by requiring a showing of background circumstances 
[which] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer 
who discriminated against the majority.  
 
Accordingly, Judge McKee concludes that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit is correct in stating that the 
"background circumstances" test "is not an additional hurdle for [W]hite 
plaintiffs." Harding, 9 F.3d at 154. He agrees with that court's belief 
that the test is merely "a faithful transposition of the McDonnell Douglas 
/Burdine test . . ." into the context of "reverse discrimination," Id. at 
154, so long as the analysis of "background 
circumstances" and the "uniqueness" of the employer is undertaken in the 
manner intended by the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit.  
 
However, even though Judge McKee believes the test to merely be a 
restatement of McDonnell Douglas, he 
concedes that it is just too vague and too prone to misinterpretation and 
confusion to apply fairly and consistently. He agrees that the approach 






1. Iadimarco's Evidence of Discrimination  
 
As noted above, Ms. Williams, a Black female, was given the position 
Iadimarco applied for. It is undisputed that Iadimarco had received a 
ranking of "superior" in each KSA category, and that he was the only 
candidate to be so ranked when the Monmouth position was filled. Williams 
never received nor requested a KSA rating. As we also noted above, Towler 
based his failure to hire Iadimarco on the fact that the other two 
candidates who received a "superior" KSA rating had already taken other 
positions and he (Towler) did not want to simply promote Iadimarco by 
default. Although that may be true, the fact that Towler then offered the 
position to someone who had no KSA rating at all certainly raises 
suspicions. Towler did not simply recruit more applicants to compete with 
Iadimarco. Rather, he recruited an additional applicant who wasn't even 
evaluated using the KSA matrix. Moreover, Williams' application was 
submitted after the deadline for applications had passed. In addition, 
Iadimarco had previously been In-Plant manager in Trenton, and therefore 
had experience as an In-Plant manager. Williams did not.  
 
Most importantly, however, Iadimarco argues that he was told that an 
engineering background was a prerequisite for the position of In-Plant 
Manager at Monmouth. He had an engineering degree, and he alleges Williams 
did not have one. Thus, although the employer may well have had legitimate 
reasons for subsequently focusing on the applicant's human relations 
skills, this does not explain why the initial focus on engineering 
backgrounds was abandoned as  Williams' candidacy emerged 
 
Additionally, we must view these circumstances in light of Pankey's 
diversity memo. In doing so, we caution that the memo is not, in and of 
itself, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of illegal 
discrimination. An employer has every right to be concerned with the 
diversity of its workforce, and the work environment. Here, however, we 
must draw all inferences in favor of Iadimarco, the nonmovant for summary 
judgment. In doing so, we assume that Pankey did write the memo that he 
signed and distributed even though he subsequently attempted to distance 
himself from it. As noted above, Pankey admitted that he signed the memo, 
but stated that it was nothing more than a "carbon copy" of a memo he had 
received from headquarters. However, defendants were unable to produce any 
such memo from headquarters. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that 
Pankey was not credible, and that his attempt to deny authorship of the 
memo was consistent with Iadimarco's allegations of bias.  
 
A reasonable fact finder could also find Towler's denial that he had 
interviewed Iadimarco significant. Towler originally conceded that 
Iadimarco had been interviewed for the position, but later denied that any 
interview had occurred. Rather, he dismissed his discussion with Iadimarco 
by asserting that it was merely a "conversation."11 In Bray v. Marriott 
Hotels, 110 F.3d 986 (3d Cir. 1997), the employer denied interviewing the 
plaintiff/applicant, but we held that conflicting evidence about the 
existence of an interview created a genuine issue of material fact. See 
id. at 992 
_________________________________________________________________  
11. Q: Okay. The conversation that you had with him, was it a direct 
result of him asking you could he come up to talk to you about the job?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: Was it your own opinion to interview him for the job?  
 
A:  I can't say it was an interview. We had a conversation referencing 
that particular position.  
 
The Court: Face-to-face conversation?  
 
The Witness: A face-to-face conversation.  
 
App. at 83HH (Towler's testimony).  
_________________________________________________________________  
 
 ("there is no testimony to support either conjecture, and, even if there 
were, it would be up to a jury to reconcile the conflicting testimony 
surrounding [plaintiff's] interview and the ranking of candidates.").  
 
Here, the District Court thought it significant that, except for Williams, 
all of the supervisors that Towler hired were 
White. See Dist. Ct. at 8-9; App. at A197 (noting that "out of the twenty-
seven plant managers hired, 74% of them 
were [W]hite males."). The District Court reasoned that this suggested 
that Towler did not discriminate against 
Whites who applied to be supervisors. However, the inquiry is not whether 
Towler and/or Pankey discriminated 
against Whites in general, but whether they illegally discriminated 
against Iadimarco.  
 
A fact finder clearly could look at the number of White supervisors Towler 
had hired and conclude that it suggested 
that he treated Iadimarco fairly. However, a fact finder could also 
conclude that Towler tried to manipulate the 
process to hire Williams because he had already hired many White 
supervisors. We cite this evidence not to suggest 
our view of it, but because it shows that there are disputed issues of 
material fact.12 "Summary judgment is precluded if a disputed fact exists 
which might affect the outcome of the suit under the controlling 
substantive law." Bray, 110 F.3d at 990 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine `if the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.' " Josey, 996 F.2d at 637 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).  
 
The Postal Service has argued that Iadimarco's claim must fail because he 
accepted another job before Williams was hired. That argument is based on 
Iadimarco's acceptance of the position of Operations Support Specialist in 
the Trenton facility in early March or April 1993. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 3. 
Iadimarco counters by explaining that he 
_________________________________________________________________  
12. Nor do we mean to infer that Iadimarco was more or less qualified than 
Williams. We take no position as to the 
respective qualifications of those two employees. only accepted the other 
position because it was becoming clear to 
him that Pankey wanted to fill the In-Plant Manager position with 
Williams.  
 
It defies all logic to hold that an alleged victim of discrimination is 
precluded from recovering damages under Title VII merely because he or she 
accepted another position after concluding that racial bias would govern 
the challenged hiring decision. If that were the law, an employer could 
freely discriminate by dillydallying until the discrimination victim was 
forced to take another position. The employer could then insulate itself 
from its discriminatory animus, and reap the fruits of its bias merely by 
arguing that the applicant had removed himself or herself from 
consideration. That would protect and reward the unscrupulous employer 
willing to delay ultimate hiring decisions in order to force the unwanted 
applicant to look elsewhere. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court 
erred in ruling that Iadimarco failed to establish a prima facie case of 
illegal race discrimination under Title VII.  
 
However, that conclusion does not end our inquiry. The District Court 
ruled that even if Iadimarco had established a 
prima facie case, the Postal Service presented a race- neutral explanation 
for its decision to hire a Black female, and 
Iadimarco had not met his burden of presenting sufficient evidence of 
pretext to rebut it. Accordingly, we will examine what, if any, evidence 
of pretext Iadimarco presented.  
 
2. Pretext  
 
"[T]o defeat summary judgment when the defendant answers the plaintiff 's 
prima facie case with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its 
action, the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a fact finder could reasonably either (1) 
disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe 
that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). However, "if 
the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficient[ ] to discredit the 
defendant's proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff 
need not also come forward with additional evidence of discrimination 
beyond his or her prima facie case ." Id. (emphasis added).  
 
In Fuentes, we held: "to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff's evidence 
rebutting the employer's proffered legitimate reasons must allow a 
factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the employer's proffered non- 
discriminatory reasons . . . was either a post hoc fabrication or 
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action." Id. (citations 
omitted). The complainant must show "such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 
could rationally find them`unworthy of credence,' and hence infer `that 
the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.' " 
Id. at 765 (citing Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527).  
 
"The plaintiff must be given the opportunity to introduce evidence that 
the proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination." 
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. Where the plaintiff does offer evidence that 
would allow reasonable minds to conclude that the evidence of pretext is 
more credible than the employer's justifications, the employer's motion 
for summary judgment must fail. White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 
56, 62 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[i]n the context of a motion for summary judgment, 
the District Court cannot decide issues of fact").  
 
Here, the District Court held:  
 
when examining the "overall scenario" in the matter at hand, plaintiff has 
not presented evidence such that a factfinder could reasonably disbelieve 
defendant's articulated legitimate reasons or that an invidious 
discrimination reason was more likely than not a determinative cause of 
defendant's actions. In light of the objective evidence presented in the 
record, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendant's 
articulated reasons for not selecting plaintiff were pretextual. 
Consequently, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted. 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 19. However, based upon all the evidence we have already 
mentioned in our discussion of Iadimarco's prima facie case, we believe 
that this record clearly allows a reasonable fact finder to conclude that 
the proffered explanation was a pretext for race-based discrimination. See 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  
 
The District Court accepted Towler's explanation for hiring Williams. The 
court capsulized that explanation as follows:  
" [Towler] did not believe that plaintiff was the right person for the 
job." Dist. Ct. Op. at 14. As we noted above, 
Towler explained that Williams "seemed to be right for the plant at the 
time." Id. at 15. This was based upon Towler's purported belief that the 
position in question required someone with a human resources dynamic that 
Williams had, and Iadimarco lacked.  
 
However, an employer can not successfully defend a hiring decision against 
a Title VII challenge merely by asserting that the responsible hiring 
official selected the man or woman who was "the right person for the job." 
The problematic nature of such an explanation is most easily seen in the 
context of discrimination against a minority or female applicant. Such an 
applicant may never be the "right person for the job" in the eyes of one 
who feels that the job can only be filled by a White male. The biased 
decision maker may sincerely believe that the White male who was offered 
the job was the right person, and minority and female candidates who were 
rejected were simply wrong for the job. The mere fact that one who 
discriminates harbors a sincere belief that he hired the "right person" 
can not masquerade as a race-neutral explanation for a challenged hiring 
decision. Such a belief, without more, is not a race-neutral explanation 
at all, and allowing it to suffice to rebut a prima facie case of 
discriminatory animus is tantamount to a judicial repeal of the very 
protections Congress intended under Title VII. Here Towler's professed 
belief that he hired Williams because she was "right for the job" can not, 
by itself, be accepted as an adequate race- neutral explanation for 
rejecting Iadimarco. Accordingly, the District Court erred in concluding 
that Iadimarco had not come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a 
factfinder to believe that the defendants' explanation of this personnel 
decision was pretextual.  
 
III. Conclusion  
 
For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that Iadimarco did establish a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination, and that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered explanation for 
not hiring him was a pretext for illegal discrimination. Accordingly, we 
will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
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